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The following paper was presented in part during the 1 s t International 
Influenza Symposium organized in Athens, on February 23 r c* 2007, 
in the amphitheatre of the Foundation of Biomedical Research of the 
Academy of Athens (FBRAA), under the auspices of the Ministry of 
Rural D e v e l o p m e n t and Food, the FBRAA and the Hel lenic 
Veterinary Medical Society. 
Η εργασία αυτή ανακοινώθηκε στο 1° Διεθνές Συμπόσιο για τη 
Γρίπη που διοργανώθηκε στις 23 Φεβρουαρίου 2007 στο αμφιθέ­
ατρο του Ιδρύματος Ιατροβιολογικών Ερευνών της Ακαδημίας Αθη­
νών από την Ελληνική Κτηνιατρική Εταιρεία, σε συνεργασία με το 
Ί δ ρ υ μ α Ιατροβιολογικών Ερευνών της Ακαδημίας Αθηνών και υπό 
την αιγίδα του Υπουργείου Αγροτικής Ανάπτυξης και Τροφίμων. 
Γρίπη πτηνών, χοίρων και ανθρώ­
πων: πόσο ισχυρός είναι ο φραγμός 
των ειδών; 
Van Reeth Κ., De Vleeschauwer Α., Kyriakis CS. , 
Pensaert M. 
Influenza in birds, pigs and humans: 
how strong is the species barrier? 
Van Reeth K., De Vleeschauwer Α., Kyriakis C.S., 
Pensaert M. 
Π Ε Ρ Ι Λ Η Ψ Η . Οι πρόσφατες επιζωοτίες της γρίπης των πτηνών 
από τον υψηλής λοιμογόνου ικανότητας Η 5 Ν 1 και τα τυχαία 
κρούσματα ανθρώπων και άλλων θηλαστικών, συμπεριλαμβανο­
μένων των χοίρων και των αιλουροειδών, έχουν θέσει σε συνα­
γερμό τη διεθνή επιστημονική κοινότητα. Νέα ερωτήματα έχουν 
προκύψει σχετικά με τη μετάδοση των ιών της γρίπης μεταξύ των 
ειδών και ο ρόλος του χοίρου ως "αναμιγνείον δοχείο" των ιών των 
πτηνών και του ανθρώπου έχει υποστεί κριτική. Ο κύριος σκοπός 
αυτής της ανασκόπησης είναι να εκτιμήσει την πιθανότητα της 
γρίπης των πτηνών και του χοίρου στο να προκαλέσουν αντίστοι­
χο λοιμώδες αναπνευστικό νόσημα στον άνθρωπο. Η μετάδοση των 
ιών της γρίπης μεταξύ των ειδών είναι σπάνια εξέλιξη γεγονότων 
και πολύ λίγοι ιοί έχουν πετύχει να εγκατασταθούν σε νέο είδος ξε­
νιστή. Μέχρι την εμφάνιση του ίου Η 5 Ν 1 το 1996 μόνο 3 περι­
πτώσεις ασθενών ανθρώπων από ιούς πτηνών είχαν αναφερθεί. Η 
μη μετάδοση από άνθρωπο σε άνθρωπο του Η5Ν1 αποδεικνύει ότι 
απαιτούνται εκτεταμένες αλλαγές του γενώματος του ίου για να 
υπερπηδηθεί ο φραγμός των ειδών. Αν και οι ιοί γρίπης των πτη­
νών έχουν απομονωθεί από χοίρους, μόνο σε μία περίπτωση ο ιός 
γρίπης των πτηνών Η I N I που μεταδόθηκε από άγριες πάπιες σε 
χοίρους ήταν ικανός για περαιτέρω εξάπλωση σε χοίρειο πληθυ­
σμό. Η ευαισθησία των χοίρων στους ιούς υψηλής και χαμηλής 
λοιμογόνου ικανότητας των πτηνών έχει επιβεβαιωθεί σε πειρα­
ματικές μελέτες, αλλά η μετάδοση από χοίρο σε χοίρο δεν έχει 
αποδειχθεί. Επίσης, περιγράφεται η πειραματική και η φυσική 
μετάδοση, των υψηλής λοιμογόνου ικανότητας ιών, στα αιλουρο­
ειδή, μυς, νυφίτσες και πιθήκους του γένους μακάκους. Ακόμη πα­
ρουσιάζονται οι κυρίες διαφορές της λοιμογόνου ικανότητας του 
ίου ανάμεσα στα διάφορα είδη των θηλαστικών. Έτσι, η μελέτη της 
λοιμογόνου ικανότητας μπορεί να προσφέρει ιδέες και γνώσεις σχε­
τικά με τα αίτια της περιορισμένης εξάπλωσης του ίου σε ένα νέο 
ξενιστή. Μπορούμε να συμπεράνουμε ότι, αντίθετα προς την κοι-
ΑΒ S T R A C Τ . The recent epizootics of the highly pathogenic 
H 5 N 1 avian influenza in poultry and the occasional infections of 
humans and other mammals, including pigs and felines, have alerted 
the international scientific community. New questions over the 
interspecies transmission of influenza viruses have been raised and 
the role of the pig as a "mixing vessel" of avian and human viruses 
has been criticized. The major aim of this review is to evaluate the 
zoonotic potential of avian and swine influenza. Interspecies 
transmissions of influenza viruses are rare virus-evolution events and 
very few viruses have succeeded to become established in new host 
species. Until the appearance of the H5N1 virus in 1996 only 3 cases 
of humans infected with avian viruses were recorded. The lack of 
human-to-human transmission of H 5 N 1 demonstrates that 
extensive changes in the virus genome are required in order to 
overcome the species barrier. Although avian influenza viruses have 
been isolated from pigs, only in one occasion an avian H I N I virus 
transmitted from wild ducks to pigs was able to further spread in 
the swine population. The susceptibility of swine to highly and low 
pathogenic avian viruses has been confirmed in experimental studies, 
but pig-to-pig transmission has not been demonstrated. 
Experimental and natural transmission of highly pathogenic avian 
viruses to felines, mice, ferrets and maqacues are also discussed, 
showing the major differences in the virus pathogenesis among 
different mammalian species. The study of this pathogenesis may 
offer insights to the reasons of limited virus spread within a new 
host. We may conclude that, contrary to common believes, the 
species barrier remains a serious obstacle for the spread of novel 
influenza viruses in new host species, including humans. Our 
experience with H 5 N 1 and H 7 N 7 has tested old established 
theories, proving them insufficient. Further study of the factors 
which influence and limit the transmission of influenza viruses 
from one species to another is needed to better understand and 
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νή άποψη, ο φραγμός των ειδών παραμένει ένα σοβαρό εμπόδιο 
για την εξάπλωση των νέων ιών γρίπης σε νέα είδη-ξενιστές, συ­
μπεριλαμβανομένου και του ανθρώπου. Η εμπειρία μας με χους 
ιούς Η5Ν1 and Η7Ν7 θέτει σε αμφιβολία τις παλιές θεωρίες και 
αποδεικνύει όχι είναι ανεπαρκείς. Χρειάζεται περαιτέρω μελέτη των 
παραγόντων που επηρεάζουν και περιορίζουν τη μετάδοση των ιών 
της γρίπης από το ένα είδος στο άλλο για να γίνει περισσότερο κα­
τανοητό και να αξιολογηθεί ο κίνδυνος της εμφάνισης νέας παν­
δημίας από ιούς γρίπης. 
Λέξεις ευρετηρίασης: γρίπη πτηνών, πτηνά, χοίροι, άνθρωπος, 
φραγμός ειδών 
INTRODUCTION 
Influenza A viruses are enveloped, single stranded 
RNA viruses in the family Orthomyxoviridae (reviewed 
in 1). Two other types of influenza-type Β and C- also 
occur in humans causing mild or subclinical infections, 
but they are unimportant for animals and are beyond 
the scope of this review. Influenza A viruses are further 
classified into subtypes based on the antigenic 
properties of the "external" glycoproteins haemagglu-
tinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA). The HA and Ν A 
are very important for the entrance and exit of the virus 
in the host's cells and for the induction of an antibody 
response in the host, but they are also highly variable. In 
constrast, the "internal" proteins like the nucleoprotein 
(NP) and matrix (M) proteins are more conserved 
between different influenza A viruses. Sixteen different 
HAs (H1-H16) and 9 different NAs (N1-N9) have been 
recognised among all influenza A viruses. The HA and 
NA can occur in different combinations, this 
combination designates the subtype of the virus. 
Influenza is the classic example of a genetically 
unstable virus and there are 2 genetic mechanisms that 
allow the virus to alter its antigenic constitution. 
Antigenic drift involves the gradual accumulation of 
small mutations in the genes encoding the HA and/or 
NA. This may result in subtle antigenic changes, which 
enable the virus to multiply significantly in individuals 
with immunity to preceding strains and thus to cause an 
influenza epidemic. Antigenic shift is a much more 
dramatic and less common antigenic change, which 
refers to the introduction of a completely novel 
influenza virus subtype in the human or animal 
population. One possible mechanism of antigenic shift 
is genetic "reassortment" between two different 
influenza virus subtypes that simultaneously infect the 
same cell. Influenza viruses have a segmented genome, 
which means that their genetic information is not on a 
single RNA strand, but on 8 separate segments of RNA, 
evaluate the risk of the emergence of new pandemic influenza 
viruses. 
Key words: avian influenza, birds, pigs, humans, species barrier 
each of which contains the information for one or two 
viral proteins. During a mixed infection the individual 
gene segments of both viruses can mix and match to 
produce a progeny virus with part of its genes from one 
virus and part from the other virus. Reassortment 
between a circulating human virus and an avian virus 
can lead to a "hybrid virus", including the avian gene 
segment that encodes a novel HA. Because humans are 
immunologically naive to such a novel subtype, it may 
spread worldwide and cause a pandemic. 
Influenza A viruses infect a large variety of bird 
species, humans, pigs, horses, seals, ferrets and mink, 
and occasionally other species, like cats and dogs. Birds, 
humans and pigs are among the most important 
influenza virus hosts, in which the infection can have 
serious economic impact. Influenza virus transmission 
between these species is rare, but it may have serious 
consequences if it occurs. The direct transmission of 
an avian influenza (AI) virus to humans, for example, or 
reassortment between human and avian virus strains 
may set the stage for an influenza pandemic in humans. 
Pigs are thought to serve as "mixing vessels" for the 
reassortment between human and avian viruses and as 
the source of pandemic influenza viruses for humans. A 
highly virulent AI virus, subtype H5N1, has recently 
become endemic in poultry in South-East Asia. The 
H5N1 virus has also crossed the species barrier to 
humans, for which it is extremely virulent, pigs, cats 
and tigers. It is feared that H5N1 may become the next 
human pandemic influenza virus if it would acquire the 
capacity to spread from human to human, which it lacks 
so far. 
Knowledge of the factors that limit avian virus 
transmission to and between mammals, and of the 
pathogenesis of AI in mammals is essential in the 
prevention of influenza pandemics. Since the 
emergence of H5N1, there has been a renewed interest 
in both issues and several old dogmas have been 
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criticised. In this paper, we first compare the 
pathogenesis of avian, human and swine influenza 
viruses in their native hosts. The second part discusses 
the pathogenesis of AI viruses in mammals, with special 
attention for the recent findings with H5N1 in humans, 
pigs and other animals. The importance of swine 
influenza as a zoonosis and general facts on host species 
barriers to influenza virus infections are also discussed. 
The nature of influenza viruses in birds, pigs and 
humans 
Wild and domestic birds(23): There are large pools of 
influenza viruses covering all known subtypes in wild 
birds, especially ducks and geese, which function as the 
reservoir for influenza viruses in domestic birds and 
mammals. While influenza viruses that have become 
established in mammals show a restricted combination 
of HA and NA subtypes, 82 different combinations have 
been isolated from wild birds. Influenza viruses also 
evolve at slower rates in wild ducks than in mammals and 
they are said to be in "evolutionary stasis". The influenza 
virus replicates in both the respiratory and intestinal 
epithelia of these ducks and high amounts of virus are 
shed in the faeces (up to 1087 50% egg infectious doses 
(EID50)/g duck faeces) for 3 to 4 weeks. Influenza 
viruses have been isolated from untreated lake water 
where large numbers of waterfowl are found and they 
are efficiently transmitted between birds through the 
faecal-oral route via surface waters. Surveillance studies 
in wild birds in North America and Europe have 
revealed a high prevalence of viruses of low virulence for 
poultry. Isolation rates may reach up to 15% in ducks 
and up to 2.8% in other wild birds, but they also depend 
on the bird species and age, time and place. Several wild 
bird species have the potential to distribute influenza 
viruses between countries or even continents, because 
they are generally asymptomatic virus carriers. 
Domestic poultry, such as chickens and turkeys, 
commercially reared ducks and geese, ratites and caged 
pet birds are also susceptible to influenza. Influenza 
viruses infecting domestic poultry can be divided into 
two distinct groups based on their clinical manifestations 
in chickens. The highly pathogenic avian influenza 
(HPAI) viruses have been restricted to subtypes H5 and 
H7, though not all viruses of these subtypes are HP, 
and cause severe disease with mortality up to 100%. 
All other viruses are low pathogenic (LP) and cause a 
much milder, primarily respiratory disease. The HA 
plays a central role in the pathogenicity of AI viruses, as 
further explained in the section on pathogenesis. The 
cases of both HPAI and LP AI in domestic poultry 
appear to result from the introduction of influenza virus 
from wild birds. Once introduced in the poultry 
population, influenza viruses can spread between 
poultry farms by a number of methods and particularly 
by mechanical transfer of infective faeces. Importantly, 
LP H5 and H7 AI viruses, that have been introduced in 
poultry flocks from wild birds, may mutate into HP 
viruses after a short or long time of circulation in the 
poultry population. Until recently, H5 or H7 subtypes 
isolated from free-living birds, were almost invariably of 
low pathogenicity for poultry. 
The Asian HP H5N1 virus, on the other hand, is 
somewhat exceptional^5). This virus has been circulating 
in Asia since 1996 and it led to the culling of millions of 
poultry in Hong Kong in 1997. Despite the eradication 
of H5N1 from Hong Kong, its precursors continued to 
circulate in ducks and geese in South China in which 
they caused largely subclinical infections. In the winter 
of 2003-2004 very severe outbreaks of H5N1 were 
almost simultaneously reported in 8 countries in South-
East Asia - South Korea, Vietnam, Japan, Cambodia, 
Indonesia, Thailand, China and Laos - and the virus is 
now enzootic in several of them. The virus has 
subsequently spilled over from poultry into the wild 
bird population and, unexpectedly, has killed thousands 
of migratory birds at the Qinghai Lake nature reserve in 
China(3). From mid 2005 until mid 2006 H5N1 infections 
in wild birds and/or poultry have also been reported in 
Russia, Turkey and several Eastern European countries, 
and some countries in Western Europe and Africa. 
Only a few cases of H5N1 in wild birds occurred in June 
2007 in Germany, the Czech republic and France.The 
H5N1 cases in wild birds in European countries without 
outbreaks among poultry suggest that wild birds may 
play a role in the spread of H5N1 to unaffected regions. 
However, the recent outbreaks of H5N1 in turkey farms 
in Hungary and the United Kingdom (February 2007) 
proved that human activities, such as the movement of 
infected poultry and poultry products, remain a major 
cause of the spread of avian influenza world wide(678). 
Humans(1910): Influenza virus subtypes that have 
become established in humans have been limited to HI, 
H2, H3, Nl and N2. Currently circulating strains are 
H1N1, H3N2 and H1N2. The H3N2 virus was 
introduced in 1968, when it caused the so-called "Hong 
Kong" pandemic and replaced the preceding H2N2 
virus. The new pandemic virus was a reassortant 
between an avian influenza virus, providing the H3 HA 
and polymerase Bl genes, and the circulating human 
H2N2 strain, which was the donor of the N2 NA and five 
other genes. H1N1 circulated among humans from the 
early 20th century until 1950, when it temporarily 
disappeared, and was reintroduced in 1977. The current 
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theory is that the H1N1 virus escaped from a laboratory 
in 1977. After their introduction in the human 
population, influenza viruses usually undergo antigenic 
changes, and this phenomenon is responsible for the 
recurrent influenza epidemics that occur in between 
pandemics. Antigenic "drift" occurs more frequently 
with H3N2 than with H1N1, which is reflected in the 
number of changes recommended in vaccine 
composition. Since 2001, H1N2 influenza viruses have 
also been isolated from humans(10). These viruses are 
reassortants between the circulating H1N1 and H3N2 
viruses, but their prevalence and clinical importance 
are unclear. Novel influenza virus strains or variants 
that arise in one continent generally spread rapidly to 
other continents, where they cause outbreaks during 
the colder months of the year. Transmission of influenza 
between humans occurs via the respiratory route, mainly 
by direct person-to-person spread. Preschool and school 
age children, who are largely immunologically naive, 
play a major role in the transmission of influenza viruses 
in the community. 
Pigs(n): The same influenza subtypes as in humans -
H1N1, H3N2 and H1N2 - are circulating in swine 
worldwide, but the swine influenza viruses (SIVs) are 
antigenically and genetically different from their human 
counterparts. The origin and nature of SIVs in different 
continents also differ, whereas there is a high degree of 
similarity among human influenza viruses worldwide. 
The predominant H1N1 SIVs in Europe, for example, 
are entirely of avian origin and they were introduced 
from wild ducks into the pig population in 1979. Two 
types of H1N1 SIV, in contrast, are circulating in the US: 
the so-called "classical" H1N1 viruses that have been 
present since the early 20th century and novel 
reassortants with the surface glycoproteins of the 
classical virus and internal proteins of more recently 
emerged H3N2 or H1N2 SIVs. Viruses of both other 
subtypes, H1N2 and H3N2, also have a different origin 
in Europe and in the US and were introduced at 
different times in the swine population. These 
differences between SIVs in different parts of the word 
also have implications for the diagnosis and control of 
SIV, and the strains used as antigens in vaccines and 
diagnostic tests also differ in Europe and in the US. A 
detailed overview of the genetic characteristics of SIVs 
worldwide is given in reference(11). It is remarkable that 
most SIVs are reassortants with mixtures of human, 
avian and swine virus genes. This supports the classical 
notion that pigs are susceptible to both human and avian 
influenza viruses, and that they can serve as "mixing 
vessels" for those viruses. Antigenic drift within SIV 
lineages does occur, but it is less prominent than 
antigenic drift with human influenza viruses. The current 
European H1N1 and H3N2 SIVs, for example, still show 
some degree of cross-reactivity with SIVs from the 1980s, 
while replacement of human influenza virus variants 
occurs more quickly. SIVs are readily transmitted by 
contact with respiratory secretions from infected pigs 
as well as by the air. It is therefore impossible to prevent 
SIV infections by sanitary measures alone, and the virus 
is enzootic in most densely swine populated regions. In 
serological investigations in Flanders, Belgium, in 2001 
and 2003, most individual sows had antibodies to a 
combination of two (48%) or to all three (31%) 
subtypes, indicating consecutive or simultaneous 
infections with several SIV subtypes during their lifetime. 
Similar findings have been made in Germany, Italy and 
Spain, where all three subtypes are also widespread. 
The pathogenesis of influenza viruses in their native 
hosts 
Wild and domestic birds{2)\ The course of an infection 
with influenza virus in birds is extremely variable and it 
depends on the virus strain, host species and 
environmental factors. Most avian influenza viruses, 
which are designated as LP viruses, will cause an 
asymptomatic or mild infection. However, a few strains 
produce systemic infection with invasion of the central 
nervous system and high mortality. These HP AI viruses 
are invariably members of the H5 or H7 subtypes, but 
not all H5 or H7 strains are highly pathogenic. LP and 
HP AI viruses show structural differences at the so-
called cleavage site of the precursor of the viral HA, 
which must be cleaved into HAI and HA2 for the virus 
to become infectious. The LP AI viruses have only one 
or a few basic amino acids at this site and cleavage 
occurs exclusively by trypsin-like host proteases. Virus 
replication is therefore restricted to sites in the host 
where such enzymes are found, i.e. the epithelia of the 
respiratory and intestinal tracts. HP AI viruses, in 
contrast, posses multiple basic amino acids at their HA 
cleavage site and can be cleaved by a broad range of 
cellular proteases. Consequently, the tissue tropism of 
HP AI viruses is not restricted to the respiratory and 
intestinal tract. These viruses invade the submucosa 
and enter vascular or lymphatic systems to replicate 
and cause lesions in a variety of cell types in visceral 
organs, brain and skin. Mortality may reach 100% 
within one week and possible symptoms are cessation of 
egg laying, respiratory signs, sinusitis, oedema of the 
head and face, subcutaneous haemorrhages with 
cyanosis of the skin, particularly of the head and wattles, 
diarrhoea and neurological signs. 
Still, the bird species also plays an important role in 
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the outcome of an infection with both LP and HP AI 
viruses. Turkeys are considered among the most 
susceptible birds and they may experience serious 
respiratory disease problems after infection with LP AI 
viruses. Turkeys and domestic chickens are also most 
susceptible to HPAI viruses. They usually show a 
fulminating disease or they die before clinical signs can 
be observed. In domestic ducks and geese and in wild 
birds, on the other hand, HPAI viruses either replicate 
poorly or to a limited degree and they produce few 
clinical signs. In addition, viruses of H5 or H7 subtype 
isolated from free-living birds are almost invariably of 
low pathogenicity for poultry. The rare isolations of 
HPAI viruses from feral birds were usually in the 
vicinity of outbreaks of HPAI in poultry. This is in line 
with the hypothesis that HP H5 or H7 viruses emerge 
after the introduction of a LP AI virus from wild ducks 
to poultry, in which such viruses can mutate to their 
pathogenic phenotype. While most HPAI viruses tend 
to be harmless in wild and domestic ducks, this is not 
always true for the currently circulating H5N1 viruses. 
These viruses have caused disease in waterfowl in 
nature and under experimental conditions and the 
increased virulence for ducks of some of the recent 
H5N1 isolates has been confirmed in experimental 
studies(12). Nevertheless some recent H5N1 isolates still 
cause minimal disease in ducks and several bird species 
may be asymptomatic carriers of the virus. 
Humans(113): Influenza infections in humans can be 
asymptomatic or cause serious illness with both 
respiratory and general symptoms. Typical symptoms 
are an abrupt onset of fever, chills, headache, myalgia, 
loss of appetite, sore throat, cough and breathing 
difficulties. The immune status of the host is very 
important for the clinical outcome and influenza is one 
of the primary causes of lower respiratory tract disease 
in children. The infection is rarely fatal in young people, 
but mortality can occur in people older than 65 years 
and in those with underlying medical conditions. 
Influenza viruses of H1N1, H3N2 and H1N2 subtypes 
generally cause similar clinical manifestations. 
The virus causes an acute infection of epithelial cells 
throughout the respiratory tract of humans and can be 
detected in both nasal and throat swabs. Intranasal 
inoculation of human volunteers with H1N1 or H3N2 
influenza virus produces a characteristic virus shedding 
pattern and febrile upper respiratory illness. Virus is 
usually detected in nasal secretions within 24 h after 
inoculation, rapidly rises to a peak of IO3°70 50% tissue 
culture infectious doses (TCID50)/ml on day 2, and is 
no longer detectable after 5-7 days of shedding. The 
amounts of virus shed and the severity of disease are 
positively correlated, which suggests that the extent of 
virus replication determines the clinical outcome. Nasal 
lavage fluids of experimentally inoculated humans 
contained elevated levels of several pro-inflammatory 
cytokines and chemokines within 2-3 days after 
inoculation ( 1 4 ). Cytokines like interferon-a and 
interleukin-6 appear to be responsible for much of the 
systemic symptoms, such as chills, malaise, fever and 
muscular aches. It is often mentioned that the lungs 
are even more susceptible than the upper respiratory 
tract, but there are in fact no comparative studies of 
influenza viral loads in the upper and lower airways of 
humans. Nevertheless, high virus yields (up to 109 50% 
egg infectious doses (EID50)/g lung tissue) have been 
recovered from the lungs of patients with fatal influenza 
pneumonia. Viral antigen has been demonstrated in 
type 1 and 2 alveolar epithelial cells, as well as in intra­
alveolar macrophages. The most significant pathology is 
also seen in the lower respiratory tract, where there is 
destruction and denudation of large areas of epithelial 
cells. Despite the systemic symptoms there are no 
indications for productive virus replication outside the 
respiratory tract. Viraemia is unusual and only rarely 
have low amounts of virus been recovered from human 
blood or extrapulmonary tissues. The presence of virus 
in the circulation most likely results from spillover from 
the lungs in those cases with severe lung tissue damage. 
Similarly, in the rare complication of influenza-
associated encephalitis influenza viral RNA has been 
detected in cerebrospinal fluid with the polymerase 
chain reaction (PCR), but active viral replication in the 
central nervous system has not been shown. Unlike in 
birds, influenza viruses apparently do not replicate in 
the intestinal tract of humans. Also, inoculation of ducks 
with human influenza viruses does not produce an 
intestinal infection. 
Swine(n'15): Swine influenza virus is a major cause of 
acute respiratory disease in pigs. Typical swine "flu" 
outbreaks are characterised by a rapid onset of high 
fever, dullness, loss of appetite, laboured abdominal 
breathing and coughing. Morbidity may approach 100%, 
but mortality is usually less than 1% and recovery occurs 
within 7-10 days. Paradoxically, subclinical infections 
are also very common and many if not most pigs become 
infected with one or several SIVs without ever showing 
clinical signs. There are no indications for differences in 
virulence between SIV subtypes and strains. 
The pathogenesis and pathology of influenza are 
strikingly similar in humans and in pigs. In experimental 
SIV infections, SIV has been demonstrated in epithelial 
cells of the nasal mucosa, tonsils, trachea and lungs. 
Nasal virus shedding usually begins on day 1 post 
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Table 1. Avian influenza viruses isolated from humans since 1996 
Year 
1996 
1997 
1998-99 
2003 
2003 
2004 
2003-...1 
Subtype -
pathotype 
H7N7-LPAI 
H5N1-HPAI 
H9N2-LPAI 
H5N1- ? 
H7N7-HPAI 
H7N3-HPAI 
H5N1-HPAI 
Location 
US 
Hong Kong 
Hong Kong/China 
Hong Kong 
The Netherlands 
Canada (BC) 
Vietnam 
Thailand 
Indonesia 
Cambodia 
China 
Turkey 
Iraq 
Azerbaijan 
Egypt 
Djibouti 
Azerbaijan 
Nigeria 
Number 
infected 
1 
18 
2 
2 
83 
2 
93 
25 
100 
7 
25 
12 
3 
8 
36 
1 
2 
1 
dead 
0 
6 
0 
1 
1 
0 
42 
17 
80 
7 
16 
4 
2 
5 
15 
0 
2 
1 
Symptoms 
conjunctivitis 
influenza-like 
influenza-like 
influenza-like 
conjunctivitis 
conjunctivitis 
influenza-like 
Reference 
(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
(16) 
(17) 
(18) 
(16) 
1
 Situation on June 15 2007 (19) 
inoculation and ceases within 7 days. Immuno-
histochemical studies demonstrate the virus' highly 
specific tropism for bronchiolar and alveolar epithelium 
and virus titres in the lungs may reach up to 108 EID50/g 
lung tissue. The characteristic microscopic lesions are 
necrosis and desquamation of lung epithelial cells and 
an influx of neutrophils into the airways. Virus clearance 
is extremely rapid and SIV is rarely isolated from the 
respiratory tract on or after day 7. As in humans, low 
virus titres have occasionally been detected in serum of 
experimentally infected pigs, but virus replication in 
extra-respiratory sites has never been demonstrated. 
An infection with SIV can be easily reproduced 
experimentally by intranasal, aerosol or intratracheal 
inoculation, but the typical "flu" symptoms and severe 
pathology only result when pigs are inoculated with 
high virus doses directly into the trachea. The 
intratracheal inoculation produces a more fulminant 
virus replication in the lungs than other inoculation 
routes and a rapid and massive secretion of interferon-
a, tumour necrosis factor-a, interleukin-1 and -6 locally 
in the lungs(15). The same cytokines are thus probably 
responsible for the typical signs of influenza in both 
pigs and humans. Based on experimental data, it is 
plausible that the amount of virus that reaches the 
deeper airways and the resulting production of 
infectious virus determine the extent of cytokine 
production in the lungs, which in turn determines the 
severity of illness. 
The fate of avian influenza viruses in mammals 
Humans: Despite the avian origin of human 
influenza viruses, influenza viruses rarely "jump" directly 
from birds to humans. From 1959 to 1996 there had 
been only three reported human cases of AI and 
humans were considered to be at low risk of infection 
with AI viruses. During the last decade human infection 
with an AI virus has been reported on 7 occasions 
(Table 1) and all cases were due to direct contact with 
infected poultry. Only 4 AI virus subtypes - H5N1, 
H7N3, H7N7 and H9N2- have been found in humans 
and most strains were HP. The majority of AI viruses 
have spread to only one or a few people, but the HP 
H7N7 and H5N1 viruses have infected tens of humans 
and the latter virus is exceptionally virulent for humans. 
The HP H7N7 outbreak in poultry in The 
Netherlands started in February 2003 and spread 
subsequently to 8 farms in Belgium and 1 farm in 
Germany. Almost 31 million poultry in The Netherlands 
were culled before the virus was contained in May 2003. 
At least 89 people, 86 of whom had close contact with 
infected poultry, contracted the H7N7 virus. Most of 
these people had conjunctivitis, but no influenza-like 
symptoms and the virus loads in throat/nose swabs were 
much lower than in conjunctival swabs, suggesting that 
the H7N7 virus had a predilection for the eye rather 
than for the respiratory tract(20). For unknown reasons, 
one 57-year-old veterinarian died from a primary viral 
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Table 2. Avian influenza virus subtypes that have been isolated from pigs since 1979 
Year 
1979 
1988 
1993-1994 
1998-2000 
1999 
2001 
2001, 2002 
2001, 2003 
Location 
Western Europe 
Taiwan, South China 
South China 
South China 
Canada 
Canada 
Canada 
China 
Subtype 
H1N1 
H3N2 
H1N1 
H9N2 
H4N6 
H3N3 
H1N1 
H5N1 
Source of infection 
wild ducks 
wild ducks 
wild ducks 
wild ducks 
wild ducks 
wild ducks 
wild ducks 
wild ducks 
Extent of 
transmission in 
swine population 
enzootic 
no data 
low prevalence 
low prevalence 
single case 
no data 
no data 
two cases 
Reference 
(34) 
(35) 
(36) 
(37) 
(38) 
(39) 
(39) 
pneumonia followed by acute respiratory distress 
syndrome and related complications^. Though 
serologic investigations suggest that about 250 humans 
may have become exposed, it is unlikely that the virus 
transmitted extensively from person-to-person(23). 
The Asian HP H5N1 virus already infected poultry 
and 18 people in Hong Kong in 1997 and it continued 
to circulate in ducks and geese in Southern China after 
its eradication from Hong Kong. Since 2004, H5N1 has 
become endemic in poultry in several countries in Asia 
and the virus later spread to some parts of Europe and 
Africa. The H5N1 outbreaks in poultry are the largest 
and most devastating in history and more than 200 
million birds have been slaughtered in largely unavailing 
efforts to contain the spread of the infection. Table 2 
gives a chronological overview of the countries that 
have reported human infections with H5N1. Most cases 
had a history of very close contact with infected poultry, 
usually within a week before the onset of clinical 
signs(2425). Inhalation of infectious droplets and self-
inoculation of the conjunctival or upper respiratory 
tract mucosa are probably the most common routes of 
infection. Some people may have become infected after 
consumption of poultry products or by oral contact with 
contaminated water. The first and most prominent 
clinical signs are a high fever (> 38 °C) and influenza­
like symptoms, but diarrhoea and gastro-intestinal signs 
are not uncommon. Symptoms of involvement of the 
lower respiratory tract - respiratory distress, difficulty 
in breathing and a crackling sound when inhaling - are 
seen in many patients. The pathogenesis of H5N1 in 
humans is not yet fully understood, but the lungs are 
clearly the major site of virus replication and viral 
antigen has been demonstrated in type 2 
pneumocytes(26). Almost all patients develop a primary 
viral pneumonia with diffuse alveolar damage, 
interstitial pneumonia, focal haemorrhages and 
bronchiolitis. There are indications that a prolonged 
overproduction of pro-inflammatory cytokines leads to 
the acute respiratory distress syndrome and multi-organ 
failure that are seen in so many patients,(27). Recent 
virological and immunological investigations in H5N1 
patients further support that the fatal outcome is 
associated with high virus replication in the respiratory 
tract and the resulting hypercytokinemia(28). 
Unlike in poultry, there is no firm evidence for a 
systemic infection in humans. There are reports of two 
fatal H5N1 cases in Vietnam with severe diarrhoea and 
encephalitis without respiratory disease(25). Only one of 
the patients was virologically examined and the virus was 
isolated from throat and rectal swabs, serum and 
cerebrospinal fluid. In another fatal case, in Thailand, 
viral RNA was detected in the lung as well as in the 
small and large intestines, but not in plasma, adrenal 
glands, brain, bone marrow, kidneys, liver and 
pancreas(26). Viral antigen-positive cells, in contrast, have 
never been demonstrated in the intestines and viral 
RNA may have been the result of virus swallowed from 
throat infection rather than from intestinal production. 
Definitive evidence of H5N1 replication in the intestines 
of humans is thus lacking. On the other hand, it cannot 
be excluded that humans may become infected after 
oral uptake of H5N1 virus, but initiation of the infection 
in this case may result from infection of oropharyngeal 
tissue rather than from a primary gastro-intestinal 
infection. 
At any rate, it must be stressed that H5N1 does not 
easily cross from birds to infect humans. Despite the 
infection of tens of millions of poultry over large 
geographical areas since mid-2003, only just over 300 
human cases have been laboratory confirmed. Most of 
these cases have occurred in households with infected 
backyard poultry and very few cases have occurred in 
presumed high-risk groups, such as commercial poultry 
workers, cullers and veterinarians. This points to the 
importance of education and implementation of hygienic 
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measures in the prevention of human H5N1 infections. 
The H5N1 virus so far fails to spread from human-to-
human and eliminating the source of infection, i.e. 
infected birds, remains the most effective control 
measure. Indonesia, for example, has already recorded 
more human deaths from bird flu than any other country 
and this is a direct result of its failure to control the 
virus in poultry. Some in vitro studies with respiratory 
tissues of humans have shown that H5N1 attaches 
preferably to epithelial cells in the lower respiratory 
tract, namely type 2 pneumocytes and epithelial cells in 
terminal bronchioles, whereas attachment becomes 
progressively more rare towards the trachea(3031). This 
was in line with the observation that the receptor for AI 
viruses occurs only in and around the alveoli of the 
human lung, but not in the nasal epithelium, trachea or 
bronchi, where the receptor for human influenza viruses 
predominates^. This led to the hypothesis that the 
H5N1 virus has difficulty in replicating in the upper 
region of the respiratory tract of humans, and that this 
hampers the virus to spread efficiently to and between 
humans. It is also feared that mutations in the receptor-
binding site of the viral HA would enable the virus to 
bind to receptors in the upper respiratory tract and this 
could increase the risk of an H5N1 pandemic. In other 
in vitro studies, however, the H5N1 virus also readily 
infected epithelial tissues of the nasopharynx, adenoid 
and tonsils(32). Most important, it remains uncertain to 
what extent the in vitro data reflect the in vivo situation 
and comparative, quantitative analyses of the replication 
of both human and avian influenza viruses in nasal 
tissues of humans are also lacking. 
Pigs: For a long time, it was thought that 
transmission of AI viruses to humans does not occur 
directly, but via the pig as an intermediate host. 
However, several "old" theories obviously need to be 
revised and the recent HP AI outbreaks have also 
changed our understanding of the role of pigs. 
A single experimental study in 1984 led to the 
conclusion that pigs readily become infected by a large 
variety of AI viruses(33). In that study, pigs were 
inoculated intranasally with 38 LP AI viruses, mainly of 
duck origin, and 29 of them were excreted in nasal swabs 
and induced a serological response. The pathogenesis of 
such viruses, on the other hand, and their potential for 
transmission between pigs have never been examined. 
In the authors' lab we have been able to confirm that 
most LP AI viruses are able to infect pigs after 
experimental intranasal inoculation of a high virus dose, 
but we also found indications that AI viruses replicate 
much less efficiently than the typical SIVs. It is not so 
surprising, therefore, that the circulation of entirely AI 
viruses in pigs in nature is a rare event. Several AI 
viruses have been occasionally isolated from pigs as 
shown in Table 2. Serological studies have also shown 
evidence for infections of pigs in Asia with avian H4, H5 
and H9 viruses(40). However, only the H1N1 virus that 
crossed from wild birds to swine in Europe in 1979 has 
become established in pigs, whereas the other viruses 
have disappeared. Still, there is circumstantial evidence 
that the genes of avian viruses may persist after 
reassortment with one or more influenza viruses 
endemic in pigs. This probably means that genetic 
reassortment or mutations are needed for successful 
transmission of AI viruses between pigs. 
One important observation was that the trachea of 
pigs contains receptors for both avian (sialic acids linked 
to galactose by an a-2,3 linkage) and human (sialic acids 
linked to galactose by an a-2,6 linkage) influenza 
viruses(41). This was seen as an explanation for the fact 
that a) pigs are susceptible to both avian and human 
influenza viruses and b) reassortants with both avian and 
human virus genes frequently emerge in pigs. The 
pandemic human influenza viruses of 1957 and 1968 
were also human-avian reassortants and one classical 
theory is that reassortment occurred in the pig, which 
served as an intermediate host to transfer the virus to 
humans. By now it has become clear that humans also 
have receptors for both human and avian influenza 
viruses, which predominate in the upper and lower 
respiratory tracts respectively(31). In addition, we have 
learned that AI viruses can transmit to humans without 
the pig as an intermediary and that genetic reassortment 
can also occur in humans. 
Though HP AI viruses can also infect pigs under 
natural and experimental conditions, it is doubtful 
whether such viruses replicate efficiently in pigs and 
whether they are readily transmitted among pigs. 
During the HP H7N7 outbreak in The Netherlands in 
2003, H7N7 antibodies were temporarily found on some 
mixed farms with swine and infected poultry, but not on 
mixed farms with non-infected poultry or on farms with 
swine only(42). After experimental intranasal inoculation 
with a high dose of the H7N7 virus, pigs shed virus in 
nasal swabs for one or a few days and showed 
seroconversion, but there was no disease or virus 
transmission to contact animals. Antibodies to the Asian 
H5N1 virus were found in only 0.25% of 3.175 pigs 
tested in Vietnam in 2004, where H5N1 has hit 
hardest ( 4 3 ). There are also unpublished reports of 
occasional infection with H5N1 in pigs in China in 2001 
and 2003, and more recently in Indonesia. In a limited 
experimental study, intranasal inoculation of pigs with 
the Vietnam/2004 H5N1 virus resulted in virus isolation 
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from the respiratory tract (tonsils, trachea and lungs), 
but not from the intestines, blood, spleen or kidney(43). 
Though this experiment confirmed the susceptibility of 
pigs for H5N1, there was no virus transmission between 
experimentally inoculated and in-contact pigs. 
Unfortunately, detailed studies of the cell and organ 
tropism of H5N1 in pigs are still lacking. 
Cats and other felidae: Cats are generally considered 
resistant to influenza(44). However, during the 2003-2004 
H5N1 outbreak in Asia, there have been occasional 
H5N1 infections in domestic cats and severe outbreaks 
in tigers and leopards in zoos in Thailand(45 46) after the 
animals had been fed virus-infected chickens. The tigers 
showed fever, respiratory distress and neurological signs 
and many of them died or were euthanatized. There was 
evidence of a generalized infection with lesions in the 
lungs, heart, thymus, stomach, intestines, liver, lymph 
nodes and brains. Virus replication was demonstrated 
in bronchiolar epithelium, hepatocytes and cerebral 
neurons. Additional natural cases of HP H5N1, 
presumably as a consequence of feeding on infected 
birds, have been reported in 3 cats and in a stone marten 
in Germany and another cat in Austria(1947). 
Under experimental conditions cats became infected 
with H5N1 after intratracheal inoculation or after 
feeding on H5N1-infected chicks(48). All cats developed 
clinical signs, including fever, decreased activity, 
protrusion of the third eyelid, conjunctivitis and 
laboured breathing. Virological examinations suggest 
that cats may be more susceptible to H5N1 than humans 
or pigs. Like in the tigers, there was a generalised 
infection in the cats. High virus titres and lesions were 
not only found in the nasal conchae, tonsils, trachea 
and lungs, but also in multiple extra-respiratory tissues 
including the central nervous system. The cats fed with 
virus-infected chickens had viral antigen-positive cells 
and virus-associated ganglioneuritis in neural plexi in 
the small intestine, but not in intestinal epithelial cells. 
It was clearly proven that the infection can be 
established via oral uptake. However, this does not 
mean that the virus enters the body via the gastro­
intestinal tract or that it replicates productively in 
intestinal cells, and the exact routes of virus entry and 
of spread to extra-respiratory tissues remain to be 
defined. Importantly, the cats excreted high amounts of 
H5N1 virus in nasal and throat swabs, and lower and 
more variable amounts in rectal swabs. Unlike in 
experiments with pigs, the H5N1 virus was transmitted 
from infected to sentinel cats in experimental 
conditions. However, data from naturally infected cats 
in Austria suggest that H5N1 AI infection in felines 
may be subclinical, and questions the horizontal 
transmission of the virus between cats(49).Thus, cats may 
be at risk of infection during H5N1 outbreaks in poultry, 
but we cannot be certain whether they will spread the 
virus to other cats. It needs to be assessed whether cats 
could spread the H5N1 virus between poultry farms or 
possibly from poultry to humans. 
Mice, ferrets and macaques are also susceptible to 
H5N1 infection, but they will not be discussed in detail. 
In macaques, the infection causes acute respiratory 
distress and virus replication appears to be confined to 
the lungs and other respiratory tract tissues. In mice and 
ferrets, in contrast, some H5N1 strains cause a 
generalized infection with a strong neurotropic 
character and mortality(50). There are several remarkable 
findings in mice and in ferrets: 1) H5N1 strains isolated 
from humans are much more pathogenic in ferrets than 
those isolated from birds. The latter viruses induced 
only mild disease in ferrets and they replicated only in 
the respiratory tract. 2) Pathogenicity in the ferret does 
not always correlate with pathogenicity in the mouse 
model. 3) Apart from the respiratory tract, the central 
nervous system is a major site of H5N1 replication in 
mice. According to some studies, virus spread to the 
central nervous system does not occur via the 
circulation, but via neural pathways following 
replication of the virus in the respiratory tract. 
The major lesson from these studies with H5N1 is 
that the pathogenesis can strongly differ in different 
mammalian species and with different virus strains. Still, 
the ports of virus entry, the primary sites of virus 
replication and the routes of virus dissemination through 
the body remain to be studied for most mammals. Such 
studies are not only essential for the control of AI in 
domestic mammals, but they may also provide 
information that can be extrapolated to humans. 
Transmission of influenza viruses between pigs and 
humans 
Occasional zoonotic infections with SIVs have been 
confirmed by virus isolation from the respiratory 
secretions or lungs of humans in Europe, Asia and the 
US (reviewed in 9). In Europe, H1N1 and H3N2 SIVs 
have been isolated from a single child in Switzerland 
and in The Netherlands. Most human infections with 
SIV have been diagnosed in the US with the "classical" 
H1N1 SIV. In general, SIV infections in people are not 
clinically distinguishable from human influenza virus 
infections, but there have been a few fatalities in the 
immunosuppressed and in pregnant women. Serologic 
studies have suggested regular transmission of SIVs to 
people in contact with pigs. Researchers in the US 
found significant associations between seropositivity to 
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H1N1 SIV and being a farm owner or entering the 
swine barn for more than 4 days per week. A more 
recent study also suggested seropositivity to H1N2 SIV 
among swine farmers and veterinarians in Iowa (51). 
However, these studies must be interpreted with care, 
because some US SIVs show serological cross-reaction 
with current the human viruses. It is thus possible that 
SIV antibody titres in humans do not really correlate 
with infection with SIV. In every way, the total number 
of SIV isolations from humans is negligible compared to 
the number of people involved directly or indirectly in 
swine farming. Also, all confirmed cases had been in 
close contact with pigs and the SIVs appear to lack the 
critical property to spread further from human to 
human. The "New Jersey" incident in the US in 1976 
may be a single exception. Here, an approximate 500 
humans became infected with an H1N1 virus identical 
to viruses isolated from pigs at the time, and a national 
emergency immunization campaign was started. 
However, it has never been established that pigs were 
the source of the virus. Also, the virus strain caused 
little or no disease in infected people and in any case 
was not pandemic. 
Wholly human influenza viruses are sometimes 
isolated from pigs, but sustained circulation of such 
viruses in pig populations seldom occurs. This contrasts 
with reassortant viruses carrying human virus genes, 
like the H3N2 viruses that have become widespread in 
swine in Europe and in the US. These viruses have 
mixtures of human genes, including the HA, and genes 
of swine and/or avian virus origin. In experimental 
infection studies in pigs, a wholly human H3N2 virus 
was excreted in much lower titres in nasal swabs and 
caused less severe lung lesions than a "triple reassortant" 
H3N2 virus(52). In further studies, virus shedding and 
pathogenicity of the human virus could be increased by 
introduction of the HA and NA of the reassortant into 
the wholly human virus by reverse genetics(53). This 
shows that the restricted infectivity of the human virus 
in pigs is at least in part dependent on the HA and NA 
gene. All these data support that efficient transmission 
of human viruses among pigs requires mutations and/or 
reassortment events, as appears to be the case for AI 
viruses in pigs. 
General considerations on the species barrier and 
conclusions 
There are many factors that limit the transmission of 
influenza viruses from one species to another and they 
are incompletely understood. An excellent summary of 
our current knowledge of the "host species barriers to 
influenza virus infections" has recently been 
published(54). A first possible barrier is the lack of 
suitable receptors on the host cell, so that the HA of a 
virus from another species cannot attach. AI viruses 
prefer sialic acid receptors with an a2,3 linkage to 
galactose, while human viruses have a preference for 
sialic acids with an a2,6 linkage. The paucity of AI virus 
receptors in the nose and trachea of humans may 
hamper transmission of avian viruses to and between 
humans. However, this theory is still a mere hypothesis 
and it certainly needs further proof. Even if an influenza 
virus succeeds to enter the cell of a new host, it must 
successfully co-opt host cell processes to replicate there. 
The polymerases of the virus, which are responsible for 
the replication and transcription of viral RNA, play a 
key role at this stage. As an example, many AI viruses 
can infect mouse cells, but fail to replicate in them and 
this has been associated with specific amino acids in 
the polymerase B2 (PB2) protein. Finally, the influenza 
virus must escape from the cell it has infected. During 
this step, the viral HA tends to re-bind to receptors on 
the cell surface and the NA helps to break this binding. 
Like the HA, the NA also has a preference for one of 
both types of sialic acid linkages and thus for humans or 
birds. One reassurance is that a large number of viral 
mutations or genetic reassortment, are obviously 
needed for an influenza virus to break the species 
barrier. Also, most of such genetic changes will be 
deleterious for the virus. Other factors that will 
influence influenza virus transmission between species 
are non-specific immune mechanisms, the routes of 
virus dissemination/excretion by the "donor" host, the 
extent of contact between donor and "recipient" host 
and the influenza immune status of the new host. It 
cannot be excluded that people with a solid immunity to 
the Nl neuraminidase of a human H1N1 influenza virus 
may be partially protected against H5N1. Moreover, 
some experimental studies have shown short-term 
immunity between different influenza subtypes(55). 
Many simple questions about the pathogenesis of 
influenza in natural and unnatural hosts also remain 
unanswered. It is still unclear whether human influenza 
viruses replicate better in the upper respiratory tract, as 
claimed by the authors of two recent in vitro studies(3°3132), 
or in the lower respiratory tract, as mentioned in so 
many textbooks. There is still discussion about the tissue 
tropism of H5N1 in humans and the lack of virological 
examinations on excretions and tissues of H5N1 patients 
is regrettable. Most important, we do not know the 
portals of viral entry and primary replication sites of 
H 5 N 1 in different mammals . T h e tissue tropism of 
H5N1 has been studied in cats, but not in other domestic 
mammals. Because of all these gaps in our knowledge, 
we cannot say which animal species could be the most 
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reliable model for human H5N1 infection. 
The possible role of pigs in the generation of new 
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they serve as intermediates for the transmission of AI 
viruses to humans. Still, this hypothesis has never been 
proven and it is questioned by some recent observations 
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